Originally published 7/15/08 at Dreaming 5GW.
by Cheryl Rofer
“Andy at Nuclear Mangoes
reminded me over the weekend of my irritation that nobody has addressed the strategy of one to a few nuclear weapons. That’s a different problem than something in the range of 5-10, which is a different problem from a higher number. None of these have been addressed systematically for today’s world.
So let’s have a blog tank. Anyone who wants to participate should post a scenario (or scenarios) on their blog or, if you don’t have a blog, in the comments to this post. Here is the problem I want to address:
What strategies are available to a country with fissionable material sufficient for 1-5 nuclear weapons, some of which may be assembled? Take into account probable responses, and assume some sort of rationality on the holders of these weapons and material. You may specifically refer to Iran and North Korea, or any other nation, or make the scenario(s) more general. Flesh out the scenario with some support.”
My thinking is that it really isn’t very cost effective for a country to build a nuclear program that provided only a few useable weapons, Once the infrastructure is in place an arsenal of a few dozen weapons would likely be possible as a country plays for time, betting that the program will reach maturity before international sanctions could ruin the country. From there it just becomes a question of the range of the possible delivery vehicles. In the event of military preemption before the program reaches its production goal, the existing weapons, if used, would most likely be used tactically, a situation that already has a well developed doctrine.
A more interesting scenario to me is what would happen if a nation or organization without a nuclear arms program should happen to find itself in possession of one to five nuclear weapons, a few former Soviet nuclear artillery shells for example. Perhaps through some sort of logistical error a few of these rounds made it into circulation in the Caucasus. Several countries militarily active in the region, including Russia, have 2S7 Pion self-propelled guns and / or 2S4 Tulip self-propelled mortars capable of firing 203mm and 240mm nuclear shells respectively. The yield of a slightly larger US weapon, the W19, was 15-20 kilotons. Reportedly, Russian weapons had higher yields than their U. S. counterparts so this range seems a good ballpark for comparison and places it in approximately the same range as Little Boy and Fat Man, the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This gives these devices a very respectable amount of potential destruction to compliment the greatest possible asset for these weapons, their portability and size. Yes, these weapons are intended to be used tactically, but is it possible to craft a scenario to use them strategically?
This situation also suggests four different types of players (aside from the pure terrorist).
1) The Outpost of Tyranny #7: Basically, a country with an authoritarian regime that wants to make waves with the big players, yet doesn’t want to be paid a visit by the Leviathan and will use these weapons to prevent that possibility.
2) The Independence movement: A country or organization that desires to set itself apart and / or establish its own country or government independent from the government that currently rules it. They want to change the map and they want to ensure that the change is permanent.
3) The Prince among the Paupers: Several countries around the world are making a concerted effort to increase their connectivity and enter the ranks of the Core while their neighbors remain firmly and resolutely in the Gap. and unfortunately those neighbors only seem to export unrest and deter foreign investment. Worse they quite often become the fourth type of player.
4) The Covetous Neighbor: These are countries, mired in third-world status, that see more prosperous and resource rich neighbors around them. Should they acquire the means, how could they acquire those resources, and how would they prevent the world for stopping them?
Looking at the problem through the problem-solving lens of XGW a few considerations become rapidly apparent for all of these players. The opposition to the possession of these weapons will likely respond with a 2GW, 3GW or 4GW (especially in the case of player #3) doctrine. Therefore a 4GW or 5GW doctrine is required. Also, as General Sir Rupert Smith would argue, the force needs to be placed in a political context or it will have no Utility. Therefore, I propose a 4GW doctrine for the operational use of these weapons within a political context shaped by a strategy using a 5GW doctrine.
The 4GW Operation:
As noted before, the greatest strength of these weapons is their size and portability. Assuming that the devices could be modified for transportation and detonation they could be possibly smuggled virtually anywhere in the world. This capability means that the weapons could very well be pre-positioned as nuclear blackmail. To add to the confusion of where the weapons are positioned and to maintain the ongoing threat I envision a nuclear shell game, where dummy weapons (maybe enhanced with slightly radioactive medical waste) are emplaced alongside the real weapons in various points around a target with dummy weapons ’allowed’ to be discovered from time to time, or whenever an object lesson is desired on the part of the player emplacing them. Each of the players that I have described could find targets that would serve their purposes in this way. As 4GW this is a strike against the will of the target, making them choose between their political goal in opposing the ‘player’ or sacrificing something potentially very valuable to them (like the center of their capital city, military base or main shipping port). The more weapons that are available, the greater the potential for deterrence.
The 5GW Strategy:
Ironically, even though the 4GW Operation benefits from more weapons being available, the 5GW strategy only requires one (and with the proper preparation you might even be able to get away with none, but that’s an advanced class). Essentially, the objective is to prove the potential of multiple weapons by openly displaying the existence of at least one weapon. Should you possess only two, one should be test-detonated and the other should be openly displayed to an authority that can realiably vouch for its authenticity. This very controlled transparency is a 5GW affect on observation that triggers existing assumptions, rule-sets and responses both in countries that are targeted and in countries that are merely in the audience. At this point even if the target believes you are bluffing your target must at least honor the threat. When that happens the shell game your 4GW Operation is playing may as well be Three-Card Monte. The key to making that happen is for the player to act in every way as if the weapons actually exist, and that the player has the ability and the will to use them. This means having a dedicated logistical and security force to service and guard nothing, exercises to employ weapons you don’t have, foreign policy that embodies deterrence by weapons that don’t exist. The reason for this is that your enemies will search relentlessly for evidence of your bluff, yet each exercise, each discovered operation, each policy decision, each and every action taken as if your nuclear capability is a reality is a confirmation that your capability is a reality.
I don’t know if I’m jumping the gun but I’m going to put in the ‘lesson’ as I see it now. Sorry if I didn’t give enough opportunity for readers to weigh in.
I think Curtis is thinking along the same lines as I am but I’m looking at it from a slightly different point of view.
To me there was only one person in this who was being manipulated, and Brown is able to do this because he is thinking on all three levels of conflict and his opponents (or targets) are not or are actively restricted from doing so.
Tactical: This is level of each of the individual games. At the tactical level Brown is only playing one game. The rest of his opponents are playing each other.
“In truth, they really were playing and choosing their own moves, based upon their own observation of the board/pieces and according to their own understanding of the game.”
Indeed, they are just doing what they naturally do and by proxying them he is guaranteed to win half and lose half of the games. His opponents, by design, may only work on this level. Even if one or more of his opponents suspects Brown is playing them against each other the asymmetric number of opponents, the statement that he has been studying them individually, and that he feels utterly prepared, should be enough to keep them from saying anything at least until the event is over. Additionally, they all came to play chess, so they are already thinking of the event in that context.
Operational: Brown has restricted/redirected the Observation of his targets so that they cannot operate at his level except to observe when each game ends and who is the winner of the game. However, there is only one player that Brown needs to notice this.
Strategic: While I am not sure if Brown’s target was actually the last game to finish or not (possibly it was editing) the positioning of Robert Chan, the only opponent Brown was actually playing, at table 9 meant that it is almost a certainty that Chan will see Brown appear to beat one or more Grandmaster level players before their own game finishes. If it was the last game to finish then Chan saw Brown walk into a room full of greats and beat half of them at the same time (even though he really didn’t). This is the target and the level of Brown’s manipulation. The entire event is staged to convince Robert Chan that Brown is able to play on the level of a Grandmaster and that he is standing in a room full of giants with cameras watching. This engineered context contains the implied meme that as a chess player Chan has no real chance of beating Brown.
So he doesn’t.